Good friend and your fellow freedom fighter Clint Richardson will be guest hosting for Dr. True Ott on MicroEffect this week. Click here for more information.
Sure, the gear may look like it came straight out of Avatar or Battlestar Galactica. But all of the laser weapons, robots, sonic blasters and puke rays pictured here are real. Some of these weapons have already found their way onto the battlefield. If the rest of this sci-fi arsenal follows, war may soon be unrecognizable.
Read on for a look at some of these futuristic weapons being tested today.
Above:
The XM-25 grenade launcher is equipped with a laser rangefinder and on-board computer. It packs a magazine of four 25mm projectiles, and programs them to detonate as they pass by their targets. That feature will allow soldiers to strike enemies who are taking cover. By 2012, the Army hopes to arm every infantry squad and Special Forces unit with at least one of the big guns.
In August, a lucky soldier got to pull the trigger, and fire off a HEAB, or High Explosive Air Burst, round at the Aberdeen Testing Ground in Maryland. Those projectiles pack quite a punch. They are purportedly 300 percent more effective than normal ammo, and will be able to strike targets as far as 700 meters (2,300 feet) away.
Two weeks ago, with help from combat aviation innovator and designer Pierre Sprey, I circulated a piece about the self-dismembering F-35 program. More recently, I submitted a revised and updated version to Military.com, but even before the editors there had a chance to run the piece, the F-35 disemboweled itself some more. While reports two weeks ago had the new estimate for cost overruns to be “as bad” as those the program’s uniquely qualified Joint Estimating Team (JET) found in 2008, newer reports state them to be perceptibly worse and that nothing has happened to fix the problems identified last year. Also, new doubts about the program have emerged with another foreign partner (Denmark), and today we are told by an Inside the Navy article that “the test article of the Marine Corps’ short-take-off, vertical-landing variant of the JSF — has once again been delayed until December due to poor weather, Kent (John Kent, Lockheed Martin spokesman) said.” That would give a new meaning to the term “all weather fighter aircraft” – that is, a fighter that cannot fly in all, rather any, weather.
Cutting edge, indeed.
At least as interesting is the reaction to the – unsurprising – unraveling of the program by Pentagon management. The JET report is described inside the Pentagon as “radio active” – and management as desperate to find a way out of the new numbers, which – by the way – the QDR’s experts on aviation have apparently decided to ignore. Some are now suggesting inside the building that the JET analysis should be whittled down to something that top management finds more (politically) acceptable.
Pray tell: all this shows that the Pentagon has changed its stripes and is reforming exactly how?
The Defense Authorization bill just signed into law by President Obama pretends a bright future for the Pentagon’s Joint Strike Fighter. The program is fully funded, and Congress even added separate authority for the alternate GE engine, advice sure to be taken when the definitive DOD Appropriations bill is enacted later this year. Meanwhile, in the real world, the F-35 program continues to fall apart. The latest – but hardly last – shoe to drop is a new internal analysis (breathlessly refuted by Lockheed) that the cost growth stage for this airplane is just beginning.
Lockheed’s refutation of the Joint Estimating Team (JET) analysis of cost growth and delays in the F-35 program borders on the hilarious: new computer aided design, simulation, and desk studies (un-validated by empirical testing) make cost growth in truly modern defense technology a thing of the past, they assert. Indeed, just like in DDG-1000, LCS, FCS, VH-71, etc., etc., etc…..
How pathetic.
Even sadder than Lockheed’s desperate grasp for reasons to do nothing to fix the self-dismembering F-35 program is the fact that the future of Western combat aviation relies on it. The 2,456 models of it on order for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will ultimately replace almost all tactical aircraft now in our inventory, except for the F-22, for which production beyond 187 aircraft was cancelled this past summer. Major allies, including Britain and much of the rest of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Israel have all made commitments to buy the aircraft. Sales to many others (there’s a long list) are postulated, and those who do not intend to buy the F-35 will probably copy it to the extent their treasuries, government bureaucracies, and technological development permit.
Unfortunately, the F-35 is unaffordable, and it is a technological kluge that will be less effective than airplanes it replaces. It will undo our air forces and our allies’, not help them.
Few agree now, but in time the finger pointing will start. That’s when someone will have to pick up the pieces to give our pilots a war winning aircraft. The road between here and there will be neither smooth, pretty, nor short, but it is time to take the first step.
A financial disaster? Impossible. Visiting the F-35 plant in Fort Worth, Texas last August, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates assured us that the F-35 will be “less than half the price … of the F-22.”
Technically, Gates is right – for now. At a breathtaking $65 billion for 187 aircraft, the F-22 consumes $350 million for each plane. At $299 billion for 2,456, the F-35 would seem a bargain at $122 million each.
However, F-35 unit cost has barely begun to will climb. In 2001, the Pentagon had planned to buy 2,866 aircraft for $226.5 billion – $79 million per airplane. In 2007, that unit cost increased to $122 million, thanks to more cost and fewer airplanes being planned.
In the next few weeks, the program will have to admit to another increase. Gates and Deputy Secretary William Lynn have re-convened a “Joint Estimating Team” (JET) to reassess F-35 cost and schedule. Last year, while a part of the Bush administration, Gates basically ignored the Team’s recommendations, but the new JET is about to reconfirm them: the F-35 program will cost up to $15 billion more, and it will be delivered about two years late, and there are rumors the JET’s findings may even be worse.
Moreover, those address only the known problems. With F-35 flight testing barely three percent complete, new problems – and big new costs – are sure to emerge. Worse, only 17 percent of the aircraft’s characteristics will be validated by flight testing by the time the Pentagon has signed contracts for more than 500 aircraft. Operational squadron pilots will have the thrill of discovering the remaining glitches, in training or in combat. No one should be surprised if the final F-35 total program unit cost reaches $200 million per aircraft after all the fixes are paid for.
This kluge is not “affordable,” either. The latest version of the F-16, heavily laden with complex electronics and other expensive modifications, costs about $60 million, twice its original price – in today’s dollars. The A-10, which the F-35 will also replace, cost about $15 million in today’s dollars. Thus, to replace the almost 4,000 F-16s and A-10s built with just over 1,700 F-35s, the Air Force will have to pay far more to buy less than half as many airplanes.
In an age when the Air Force budget looks to increase only marginally, if at all, while simultaneously planning to buy several other major aircraft (new aerial tankers, new transports, new heavy bombers, and new helicopters), the plan to distend the fighter-bomber budget is a pipe dream.
While most, but not all, in the Pentagon and Congress remain oblivious to the unaffordability of the F-35, some of its foreign buyers are becoming horrified. Despite their governments’ investment of hundreds of millions, parliamentarians and analysts in Australia, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands are expressing real concerns. The F-35′s single largest international partner is the United Kingdom. There, the Royal Navy and Air Force have just decided to reduce their F-35 buy from 138 aircraft to 50. The reason: “We are waking up to the fact that all those planes are unaffordable.”
The problems with the F-35 are not limited to its cost.
As a fighter, the F-35 depends on a technological fantasy. Having failed to develop in the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s an effective (and reliable) radar-based technology to shoot down enemy (not friendly) aircraft “beyond visual range,” the Air Force is trying yet again with the F-35, like the F-22 before it. Both have the added development of “stealth” (less detectability against some radars at some angles), but that new “high tech” feature and the long range radar have imposed design penalties that compromised the aircraft with not just high cost but also weight, drag, complexity, and vulnerabilities. The few times this technology has been tried in real air combat in the past decade, it has been successful less than half the time, and that has been against incompetent and/or primitively equipped pilots from Iraq and Serbia.
If the latest iteration of “beyond visual range” turns out to be yet another chimera, the F-35 will have to operate as a close-in dogfighter, but in that regime it is a dog. If one accepts every aerodynamic promise DOD currently makes for it, the F-35 will be overweight and underpowered. At 49,500 pounds in air-to-air take-off weight with an engine rated at 42,000 pounds of thrust, it will be a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight and acceleration for a new fighter. In fact, at that weight and with just 460 square feet of wing area for the Air Force and Marine Corps versions, the F-35′s small wings will be loaded with 108 pounds for every square foot, one third worse than the F-16A. (Wings that are large relative to weight are crucial for maneuvering and surviving in combat.) The F-35 is, in fact, considerably less maneuverable than the appallingly vulnerable F-105 “Lead Sled,” a fighter that proved helpless in dogfights against MiGs over North Vietnam. (A chilling note: most of the Air Force’s fleet of F-105s was lost in four years of bombing; one hundred pilots were lost in just six months.)
Nor is the F-35 a first class bomber for all that cost: in its stealthy mode it carries only a 4,000 pound payload, one third the 12,000 pounds carried by the “Lead Sled.”
As a “close air support” ground-attack aircraft to help US troops engaged in combat, the F-35 is too fast to identify the targets it is shooting at; too delicate and flammable to withstand ground fire, and too short-legged to loiter usefully over embattled US ground units for sustained periods. It is a giant step backward from the current A-10.
It is time to start fixing this mess. Needless to say, the complexities of Pentagon procurement regulations and especially the circle-the-wagons mentality of the Pentagon and Congress present serious hurdles to be overcome, most of them ethical.
First is the need is to accept the facts as they exist, rather than as Lockheed and self-interested bureaucrats in the Pentagon would prefer them to be. That will mean accepting the JET recommendations as currently written – not watering them down to make them palatable, or ignoring them as they were in 2008 under Gates’ first term as SecDef.
Let’s watch closely and see if the original JET findings are watered down by Deputy Secretary Lynn or others who helped to father the Joint Strike Fighter in the Clinton Administration, or others, such as Acquisition Czar Ashton Cater, who will have to re-jigger the Air Force’s entire long range budget to accommodate more F-35 cost. His having been forthright about underhanded Air Force behavior on the F-22, perhaps we can hope that Gates will insist on ethical behavior on the F-35. We shall see.
Comparing the original JET findings with whatever comes out the other end should be easy. The details of the study were reported by Jason Sherman at InsideDefense.com; other outsiders are familiar with just what is in the JET analysis, and quick reaction professionals like Colin Clark at DODBuzz will surely have a field day if top Pentagon management tries to fudge what’s in the JET study. The glare of public understanding is always a good way to appeal to the patriotism of top Pentagon management.
In addition to listening to the facts, we will need to exercise the professed spirit of the new Weapon System Acquisition Act, signed into law by President Obama last May. While the fine print of the new law is hopelessly riddled with loopholes to protect business as usual, the bill purports to control costs and inspire competition, especially the “fly-before-buy” competitive approach that has worked so marvelously well the few times it’s been tried.
This is the same vision that President Obama expressed to the VFW in Phoenix last August when he said he wanted to stop “the special interests and their exotic projects that are years behind schedule and billions over budget.” Clearly, no one has told the President that the F-35 is a leading poster child for those evils.
Finally, the biggest step, would be to suspend further F-35 production until the test aircraft, all of them now funded, can complete a revised, much more thorough flight test schedule. Once we know the F-35′s realistically demonstrated performance and problems, and the full extent of its costs, we can make an informed decision whether to put it into full production. To do that, the upside down F-35 acquisition plan — which buys 500 aircraft before the “definitive” test report (the one that only flight tests 17 percent of F-35 characteristics) is on Gates’ desk — needs to be radically recast into real fly-before-buy plan. Just the kind of plan the new Acquisition Reform Act pretends to advocate.
In the almost certain event that the F-35 is found by uncompromised, realistic testing to be an unaffordable loser, there are viable alternatives. If an active consensus develops to reverse the current aging and shrinking of the existing tactical aviation inventory (as opposed to today’s silent conspiracy encouraging those trends to worsen), a short term, affordable fix to restore combat adequacy is needed: Extend the life of existing F-16 and A-10 airframes for the Air Force and continue purchasing F-18E/F aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps. For the part of the inventory that most urgently needs immediate expansion, the A-10 and the close support mission, hundreds of airframes now sitting in the “boneyard” can and should be refurbished – something that can be done at extraordinarily modest cost.
Just a life-extension program will not address long term needs. Accordingly, competitive prototype fly off programs should be immediately initiated to develop and select new fighters to build a larger force that is far more combat-effective than existing the F-16s, F-18s, and A-10s. Just such programs — that lead to an astonishing 10,000 plane Air Force within current budget levels — are described in detail in “Reversing the Decay in American Air Power,” a chapter in the anthology America’s Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress (Stamford University Press).
You can almost literally hear the howls of protest right now. The F-35 is too big to fail. Gates himself seems trapped by that logic; he said “My view is we cannot afford as a nation not to have this airplane.” We take the opposite view. The F-35′s bloat — in cost, leaden weight, and mindless complexity — guarantees failure. It will shrink our air forces at increased cost, rot their ability to prevail in the air and support our ground forces, and will needlessly spill the blood of far too many of our pilots.
We have to take the first steps to better understand the extent of the F-35 disaster and to reverse the continuing decay in our air forces.
For those who’ve decided to own a gun I have some observations to save time in deciding which are optimal for your Armory.
The world of guns can be confusing and inaccessible. If you’re an optimizer like me it’ll leave you spinning in a hundred different directions down a thousand separate paths. Whether you want to cut to the chase, immediately, or enjoy going down those thousand paths (as I do) this article will provide perspective on what is Your Optimal Armory.
Purchase the least number you need. If Gun #1 is enough then stop there. That keeps your cost and maintenance down while focusing your skills on what you have.
Gun #1, Personal Defense & Utility (85%)
If you’ll only have one gun then purchaseThe Best Gun in The World, a 5-shot .357 magnum revolver or a Glock 23 .40 S&W depending on your skill level. You’ll need to be a bit more comfortable with a sidearm to feel comfortable with the Glock 23. For that comfort you’ll get 8 more rounds at your disposal.
This revolver or semi-auto will do almost everything you’ll need at close range and is small enough to be carried with you everywhere. That makes it most likely to be there when you need it. It’s your tool for rabid animals, snakes, bad guys, dog attacks, home invasions, varmints and may even put protein in your belly in a survival situation. Its not the best tool for every job. But, it’s the tool you’ll most likely have with you when the job needs to get done.
Get training, store it in a bedroom safe and practice enough to feel totally comfortable using it at all times & situations. Use .38 rounds in the revolver for cost-effective practice before you’re ready for the .357 magnum round.
That’s it. Perhaps 85% of what you’ll ever need a gun for is now covered. How’s that for a timesavings?
Gun #2, Home Defense & Utility (95%)
If your optimal armory will have two guns then I recommend adding a 12-guage pump-action shotgun.
The 12-guage is the most diverse and powerful long gun there is. Depending on what kind of shells you load it with the same gun will shoot birdshot, buckshot, slugs, darts (fléchette rounds), explosive fragments, bean bags, pepper gas, tear gas, rock salt, rubber slugs/buckshot, pyrotechnic whistles, bolo’s and even flares.
What do all these shells do? Almost everything except provide long-range precision. That’s where a rifle comes into play.
NOTE: Most people will have accomplished 95% of what they’ll ever need a gun for with only these two guns! Because these two guns do so much I recommend getting them first and foremost before considering a third gun. I make that recommendation even if you’re interested in the remaining 5% utility (as I certainly am) not covered by the first two. You’re better off practicing and experimenting with the different types of ammunition for each before deciding to add a third gun to your armory.
Gun #3/4, Long-Range Precision (99.9%)
If you need long-range precision then you’ll need a third gun: A long-range rifle. This is where things can get complicated. So complicated, that I’ll need to reveal the key to how I decided on the recommendations for the first two guns in the optimal armory: Ammunition.
The best way to sum it up and keep this article from getting out of control is to say that shooting is rocket science! You’re better off deciding on the rocket before building the launching pad. Likewise, choose the bullet first and the gun that shoots it second. The coolest rifle is just extra weight if the ammo doesn’t do the job, costs so much you won’t practice or isn’t available. Consider these aspects of ammunition:
Stopping power
Specific use most likely
Range & accuracy
Types of same caliber available
Overall utility (in addition to most like use)
Availability
Number of suppliers
Price
Ability to make your own reloads
Weight (limits # you can carry?)
Various gun models available that shoot same ammo
For these reasons I recommend one of the following rifles for Gun #3:
A lever gun that uses the .357 magnum rounds you already use in Gun #1.
A .308 hunting rifle.
Lever Rifle
The lever gun rifle is the rifle equivalent of a revolver: It’s simple, easy to use, easy to maintain, will fire even when dirty and is more likely to be available when you need it. This option economizes on existing ammunition and keeps things simple for your armory. It provides increased range, power and precision in an easy-to-maintain package.
.308 Hunting Rifle
If you need more range, power and precision than a .357 rifle can provide then go with a .308 hunting rifle. It is arguably the most accurate long-range cartridge in existence. In exchange for that accuracy you give up little power over other competing long-range rounds. There are more powerful cartridges available. However, why have a more powerful round that doesn’t hit the target?
Consider Getting Both
If you’re trying to minimize the number of guns you need to maintain then just choose one of these long-range rifles. However, if your choice is the .308 there’s little cost to adding the .357 lever gun, as well. It shoots the same rounds you’re keeping for your revolver and is easy to maintain. For times when a high-powered .308 is too much you’ve got the lever gun like a hammer in your toolkit.
Gun #5, Practice for Less
A .22 caliber Long Rifle will enable cost-effective target practice without breaking the bank on .308 rounds. $1 apiece for .308 rounds is not too bad when you consider all that the round can accomplish. But, you can shoot the .22 LR’s all day for practice until you’re ready for the .308.
The .22 LR is also a great varmint gun extending your reach (but not necessarily power) out to 100 yards. These come in lever or semi-automatic so can mirror your Gun #3/4 choices for practice.
Gun #6, Liberty Comes From the Barrel
Anything a .308 rifle can’t handle is an emergency or you ran out of bullets.
In fact, I chose the .308 cartridge for those two reasons: If you need to handle an emergency or are running out of bullets then you’re escalating to a semi-automatic battle rifle. Working backward from the ammunition the military has standardized on the .308 calling it by its metric name: The 7.62x51mm NATO rifle cartridge.
What this means is that your .308 hunting rifle may use the same ammunition as two of the best battle rifles: The M1A and the FN-FAL. This could make your armory more efficient by keeping only one round for both.
In practice, the two cartridges are not identical. Any .308 can shoot any 7.62mm round, but, not the other way around. You may have to make a tradeoff in performance on each gun but you could, theoretically, settle on one .308 round for both guns in your armory. You would get very familiar with the characteristics of the round and might even be making them, at that point.
NOTE: Some hunters have gone right to a .308 semi-automatic rifle in effect combining Gun #3 and Gun #6. To make that tradeoff you’ll have to be willing to carry a much heavier gun while you’re hunting. For perspective, some troops considered the 9.5lb M1A to be heavy in WWII. A .308 semi might be somewhere around 9–15 lbs not including a scope or ammunition.
More Than One Shooter?
The optimal armory, so far, assumes one shooter. If there’s more than one shooter then Gun #7 starts at the beginning arming the 2nd shooter withThe Best Gun in the World. The second shooter can be trained on the .22 LR prior to being issued their .357 revolver.
With two shooters in the home its time to create home defense procedures. People have to be aware of lines of fire, well-known positions to take in the event of a situation, what are the rules of engagement for the house, etc. That starting to sound like a different article, isn’t it?